Theologians in some cases use the proof of miracle to prove the existence of God. This paper, surveying the relation of miracles to the proofs of the field, has intended to find the degree of miracle proof’s validity for the existence of God in Islamic and Christian theology. The conclusion would not only lead to the clearness of the real place of the proof and its usage but also help commentators to understand real meaning of the verses in the field. (...) In the paper, the nature of miracle is described in a religious approach at first and then, the usage of the proof of miracle in Muslim and Christian theologians’ works is studied. Finally, the usability of the proof and degree of its validity have been critically studied. (shrink)

This paper is going to re-read Imam Mohammad al-Ghazali’s moral ideas in order to find the responses to the questions of moral psychology. Al-Ghazali, following the Greek and Islamic philosophers, relates each virtue or vice to a particular faculty in man’s soul. Moreover, following the Asharites, he considers the basis of moral good and badness to be religious. Furthermore, having mentioned al-Ghazali and Hume’s opinions as well as their similarities, this writing explains why al-Ghazali’s view on the moral motivation has (...) not encountered Hume’s objections. And finally, it presents the differences between al-Ghazali and the Greek philosophers’ views on virtues and vices as well as evaluates al-Ghazali’s psychological opinions in ethics. (shrink)

The present paper mainly seeks to elaborate on how the problem of soul and its temporality or eternity occupied Mulla Sadra and Plato's minds. What reasons made Plato to believe in eternity of soul? Why Muslim philosophers, especially Mulla Sadra, did not face such constraints in spite of the fact that they did not accept these reasons? To this end, the present paper reviews not only these two thinkers' works but also their social status and intellectual concerns, which resulted in (...) developing their specific thoughts. It seems that the problems related to the issue of soul cannot be solved except with Muslim philosophers' existential view and particularly with Mulla Sadra's innovations in philosophy. (shrink)

This article concentrates on the later Wittgenstein. The main problem is how we can apply his later philosophical thought to religion and religious belief. The result is that, according to Wittgenstein, religious beliefs are not such as scientific hypotheses and need not being supported by rational arguments and evidence, but they are pictures on which believers arrange and set out their forms of life. So, according to the article, Wittgenstein neither accepts nor rejects language game of religion. He just says (...) that this form of life exists and has its limits and prejudices. Religion, like any other conceptual schemata, logically depends on bounds and frontiers or, in better words, on social or contextual rules. If this language game is to be played and adopted, we’ll have to adopt and follow such limits and rules. (shrink)

Tracing out the origins of the Trinitarian 'revivial' in the modern era, through to the destabilizing effects of postmodernity on Trinitarian discourse, the author provides a critical hermeneutic for the evaluation and implementation of Trinitarian theology in the contemporary world.

In this provocative and original work, Slavoj Zizek takes a look at the question of human agency in a postmodern world. From the sinking of the Titanic to Hitchcock's Rear Window, from the operas of Wagner to science fiction, from Alien to the Jewish Joke, the author's acute analyses explore the ideological fantasies of wholeness and exclusion which make up human society. Linking key psychoanalytical and philosophical concepts to social phenomena such as totalitarianism and racism, the book explores the political (...) significance of these fantasies of control. In so doing, The Sublime Object of Ideology represents a powerful contribution to a psychoanalytical theory of ideology, as well as offering persuasive interpretations of a number of contemporary cultural formations. -- Back cover. (shrink)

Maḥmūd, Zakī Najīb, 1905-; philosophers; Egypt; biography; interview.

In these two long-distance interviews, Iranian Saeed Naji, founder of the Philosophy for Children movement in Iran, questions two veteran practitioners of philosophy for children/community of philosophical inquiry . He raises issues related to P4C/CPI as representative of a larger educational paradigm, which he calls “reflective education,” and weighs its prospects for replacing what he calls the “traditional paradigm” worldwide. He also queries the two scholars on issues such as criteria for appropriate texts/stimuli for practicing philosophy with children; issues (...) around teacher preparation; the epistemological paradigm of CPI and its relation to the logic of scientific discovery and mathematical proof; the status of CPI as a “new” or reconstructed form of the discipline of philosophy; the prospects for a narrative approach to philosophy as exemplified in the new literary genre of the Lipmanian philosophical novel for children; the relationship between the practice of CPI in schools and the possibility for educational reconstruction, particularly in the area of social democracy and school governance; the significance of understanding the child as a “privileged stranger” to patriarchal colonialist culture, and the social implications of a form of education based on dialogue rather than forced enculturation; and the implications for the construction and delivery of curriculum in a school in which CPI and emergent curriculum were central organizational elements. (shrink)

In Less Than Nothing, the pinnacle publication of a distinguished career, Slavoj i ek argues that it is imperative that we not simply return to Hegel but that we repeat and exceed his triumphs, overcoming his limitations by being even more ...

al-juzʼ al-awwal. Ḥiwār al-ḥukamāʼ (Rasāʼil fī al-naqd al-falsafī) -- al-juzʼ al-thānī. Rasāʼil ilá al-faylasūf Diyūjīnūs (Ḥiwār fī al-naqd al-falsafī) -- al-juzʼ al-thālith. Rasāʼil ilá al-Malik al-faylasūf Mārkūs Aurlīūs -- al-juzʼ al-rābiʻ. Rasāʼil ilá rajul ḥasan al-nīyah (Ḥiwār fī al-naqd al-falsafī) -- al-juzʼ al-khāmis. Ḥiwār fī naqd al-ʻaql al-ḥaḍārī (Ḥiwār fī al-naqd al-falsafī).

The latest book by the Slovenian critic Slavoj Zizek takes the work of French philosopher Gilles Deleuze as the beginning of a dazzling inquiry into the realms of radical politics, philosophy, film (Hitchcock, Fight Club ), and psychoanalysis. Of Organs without Bodies Joan Copjec ( Imagine There's No Woman ) has written: "With all his ususal humor and invention, Zizek -- the acknowledged master of the 180 degree turn -- here takes a trip into "enemy" territory to deliver Deleuze of (...) a marvelously rebellious child, one that seriously challenges Deleuze's other progeny with a surprising but convincing bid for succession. Those who thought Deleuze's forward march into the future would follow a straight path are forced to rethink their stance. From now on all readings of Deleuze will have to take a detour through this important -- even necessary -- book." Eric Santner ( On the Psychopathology of Everyday Life ) describes Organs without Bodies as offering "an entirely new degree of conceptual clarity and political urgency. Through his deep engagement with the logic of Deleuze's project, Zizek opens up new possibilities of thought beyond the terms of the current political debates on globalization, democratization, war on terror. Once again, Zizek has produced an utterly timely and radically untimely meditation." Recently profiled in The New Yorker , and hailed by the Village Voice as "the giant of Ljubljana," Zizek is one of the most provocative and entertaining thinkers at work today. (shrink)

On state, its sovereignty, constitution and independent judiciary.

With his characteristic wit, Zizek addresses the burning question of how to reformulate a leftist project in an era of global capitalism and liberal-democratic ...

Book synopsis: In this combative major new work, philosophical sharpshooter Slavoj Zizek looks for the kernel of truth in the totalitarian politics of the past. Examining Heidegger's seduction by fascism and Foucault's flirtation with the Iranian Revolution, he suggests that these were the 'right steps in the wrong direction.' On the revolutionary terror of Robespierre, Mao and the bolsheviks, Zizek argues that while these struggles ended in historic failure and horror, there was a valuable core of idealism lost beneath the (...) bloodshed. A redemptive vision has been obscured by the soft, decentralized politics of the liberal-democratic consensus. Faced with the coming ecological crisis, Zizekk argues the case for revolutionary terror and the dictatorship of the proletariat. A return to past ideals is needed despite the risks. In the words of Samuel Beckett: 'Try again. Fail again. Fail better.'. (shrink)

This book on Philosophy for Children is a compilation of articles written by its founders and the movement's leaders worldwide. These articles have been prepared in the dialogue and interview format. Part I explains the genesis of the movement, its philosophical and theoretical foundations. Part II examines the specialized uses of philosophical dialogues in teaching philosophy, morality, ethics and sciences. Part III examines the theoretical concerns such as the aims of the method in regards to the search for truth or (...) sense of meaning, or the debate on the novel or short stories and its characteristics. Part IV explains the practices of P4C worldwide and the issue of cultural differences, the ways of the community of inquiry and the necessary adaptation to suit local concerns. The book concludes with a notable review of the progress of P4C, the obstacles, and its international spread to over 60 countries. These penetrating insights make the book an incredibly rich resource for anyone interested in or involved with implementing a P4C programme. Brave Old Subject, Brave New World Teaching Science and Morality Via P4C Showing Children can do Philosophy. (shrink)

Whenever the membranes of the egg in which the foetus emerges on its way to becoming a new-born are broken, imagine for a moment that something flies off, and that one can do it with an egg as easily as with a man, namely the hommelette, or the lamella. The lamella is something extra-flat, which moves like the amoeba. It is just a little more complicated. But it goes everywhere. And as it is something - I will tell you shortly (...) why - that is related to what the sexed being loses in sexuality, it is, like the amoeba in relation to sexed beings, immortal - because it survives any division, and scissiparous intervention. And it can turn around. Well! This is not very reassuring. But suppose it comes and envelopes your face while you are quietly asleep... I can't see how we would not join battle with a being capable of these properties. But it would not be a very convenient battle. This lamella, this organ, whose characteristic is not to exist, but which is nevertheless an organ - I can give you more details as to its zoological place - is the libido. It is the libido, qua pure life instinct, that is to say, immortal life, irrepressible life, life that has need of no organ, simplified, indestructible life. It is precisely what is subtracted from the living being by virtue of the fact that it is subject to the cycle of sexed reproduction. And it is of this that all the forms of the objet a that can be enumerated are the representatives, the equivalents. Every word has a weight here, in this deceivingly poetic description of the mythic creature called by Lacan "lamella". Lacan imagines lamella as a version of what Freud called "partial object": a weird organ which is magically autonomized, surviving without a body whose organ it should have been, like a hand that wonders around alone in early Surrealist films, or like the smile in Alice in Wonderland that persists alone, even when the Cheshire cat's body is no longer present: "'All right', said the Cat; and this time it vanished quite slowly, beginning with the end of the tail, and ending with the grin, which remained some time after the rest of it had gone. 'Well! I've often seen a cat without a grin', thought Alice; 'but a grin without a cat! It's the most curious thing I ever saw in my life!'" The lamella is an entity of pure surface, without the density of a substance, an infinitely plastic object that can not only incessantly change its form, but can even transpose itself from one to another medium: imagine a "something" that is first heard as a shrilling sound, and then pops up as a monstrously distorted body. A lamella is indivisible, indestructible, and immortal - more precisely, undead in the sense this term has in horror fiction: not the sublime spiritual immortality, but the obscene immortality of the "living dead" which, after every annihilation, re-composes themselves and clumsily goes on. As Lacan puts it in his terms, lamella does not exist, it insists: it is unreal, an entity of pure semblance, a multiplicity of appearances which seem to envelop a central void - its status is purely fantasmatic. This blind indestructible insistence of the libido is what Freud called "death drive," and one should bear in mind that "death drive" is, paradoxically, the Freudian name for its very opposite, for the way immortality appears within psychoanalysis: for an uncanny excess of life, for an "undead" urge which persist beyond the cycle of life and death, of generation and corruption. This is why Freud equates death drive with the so-called "compulsion-to-repeat," an uncanny urge to repeat painful past experiences which seems to outgrow the natural limitations of the organism affected by it and to insist even beyond the organism's death - again, like the living dead in a horror film who just go on. This excess inscribes itself into the human body in the guise of a wound which makes the subject "undead," depriving him of the capacity to die : when this wound is healed, the hero can die in peace. (shrink)

With a new introduction by the author In this deliciously polemical work, a giant of cultural theory immerses himself in the ideas of a giant of French thought.

Sometimes, learning about the origins of a belief can make it irrational to continue to hold that belief—a phenomenon we call ‘genealogical defeat’. According to explanationist accounts, genealogical defeat occurs when one learns that there is no appropriate explanatory connection between one’s belief and the truth. Flatfooted versions of explanationism have been widely and rightly rejected on the grounds that they would disallow beliefs about the future and other inductively-formed beliefs. After motivating the need for some explanationist account, we raise (...) some problems for recent versions of explanationism. Learning from their failures, we then produce and defend a more resilient explanationism. (shrink)

As a slew of recent work in epistemology has brought out, there is a range of cases where there's a strong temptation to say that prudential and (especially) moral considerations affect what we ought to believe. There are two distinct models of how this can happen. On the first, “reasons pragmatist” model, the relevant prudential and moral considerations constitute distinctively practical reasons for (or against) belief. On the second, “pragmatic encroachment” model, the relevant prudential and moral considerations affect what one (...) is epistemically justified in believing. The pragmatic encroachment model appears to have several advantages over reasons pragmatism, and this has led many recent philosophers to endorse the former. However, in this paper we argue that a version of reasons pragmatism can be (at least largely) saved from these purported disadvantages once paired with an independently plausible permissivism about epistemically justified outright belief. This hybrid view—“permissivist pragmatism”—holds that when there is more than one epistemically permitted doxastic attitude, practical (including moral) considerations can determine which epistemically permitted doxastic attitude one all-things-considered ought to have. This view avoids both the problems faced by simple versions of reasons pragmatism, and those that distinctively attend pragmatic encroachment, while preserving the advantages of each view. (shrink)